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Abstract
Potential home buyers may initiate contact with a real estate agent by asking
to see a particular advertised house. This paper asks whether an agent’s response
to such a request depends on the race of the potential buyer or on whether the
house is located in an integrated neighborhood. We build on previous research
about the causes of discrimination in housing by using data from fair housing au-
dits, a matched-pair technique for comparing the treatment of equllay qualified
black and white home buyers. However, we shift the focus from differences in the
treatment of paired buyers to agent decisions concerning an individual housing
unit using a sample of all houses seen during he 1989 Housing Discrimination
study. We estimate a random effect, multinomial logit model to explain a real
estate agent’s joint decisions concerning whether to show each unit to a black
auditor and to a white auditor. We find evidence that agents withhold houses in
suburban, integrated neighborhoods from all customers (redlining), that agents’
decisions to show houses in integrated neighborhoods are not the same for black
and white customers (steering), and that the houses agents show are more likely
to deviate from the initial request when the customeris black than when the cus-
tomer is white. These deviations are consistent with the possibility that agents act
upon the belief that some types of transactions are relatively unlikely for black
customers (statistical discrimination).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D1, D4, J7, R3
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Potential home buyers may initiate contact with a real estate agent by asking to see a 
particular advertised house. This paper asks whether an agents response to such a request 
depends on the race of the potential buyer or on whether the house is located in an integrated 
neighborhood. We build on previous research about the causes of discrimination in housing by 
using data from fair housing audits, a matched-pair technique for comparing the treatment of 
equally qualified black and white home buyers. However, we shift the focus from differences in 
the treatment of paired buyers to agent decisions concerning an individual housing unit using a 
sample of all houses seen during the 1989 national Housing Discrimination study. We estimate a 
random effect, multinomial logit model to explain a real estate agent’s joint decisions concerning 
whether to show each unit to a black auditor and to a white auditor. We find evidence that agents 
withhold houses in suburban, integrated neighborhoods from all customers (redlining), that 
agents decisions to show houses in integrated neighborhoods are not the same for black and 
white customers (steering), and that the houses agents show are more likely to deviate from the 
initial request when the customer is black than when the customer is white. These deviations are 
consistent with the possibility that agents act upon the belief that some types of transactions are 
relatively unlikely for black customers  (statistical discrimination). 
Introduction 
 
Many market interactions involving search begin with a complicated request from a 
customer to an agent. The agents interpretation of this request may influence his subsequent 
behavior and hence influence the outcomes of the interaction. Moreover, this interpretation and 
the resulting behavior may depend on characteristics of the customer, such as race or ethnicity, 
or on the nature of the request itself. This paper uses data from fair housing audits to study the 
way real estate agents respond to a customers initial request for housing, with a focus on the 
extent to which an agents responses to a given request depend on the customers race or on the 
racial composition of the neighborhood in which the housing is located. 
This approach sheds light on both the complexity of housing search and on the form and 
causes of racial discrimination by real estate agents. We find, not surprisingly, that a customers 
initial housing request has a major impact on an agents subsequent behavior. In addition, we 
find evidence that requests for housing in integrated areas are not treated the same as those in 
white areas. We also find that agents do not respond the same way to black and white customers, 
even when they make identical housing requests. This result is consistent with hypothesis that 
real estate agents practice statistical discrimination. This entirely new picture of housing market 
discrimination is uncovered through the use of a new methodology, in which an individual 
house, not an audit, is the unit of observation.  
A fair housing audit compares the treatment of an African-American or Hispanic home 
seeker with the treatment of an equally qualified white home seeker.1 Discrimination is defined 
as unfavorable treatment based solely on a persons membership in a particular group; in a 
sample of audits, discrimination is systematic unfavorable treatment of minority auditors. Audits 
conducted as part of the 1989 Housing Discrimination Study (HDS) were based on 
advertisements randomly selected from a newspaper. In the sales audits, audit teammates began 
  
 
 
their visits to a real estate agent by asking about the availability of a house in one of these 
advertisements. As a result, audit teammates made exactly the same initial request, and it is 
possible to determine whether agent responses to that request differ by the race or ethnicity of the 
customer or by the characteristics of the neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located. 
This research builds on a large literature concerning the causes of discrimination in 
housing. Most of this literature uses audit data to study minority-white differences in the number 
of housing units shown or recommended to an auditor (Page 1995; Roychoudhury and Goodman 
1992, 1996; Yinger 1986, 1995) or on discrete agent choices during an audit (Ondrich, Stricker, 
and Yinger, 1998, 1999). In regressions to test hypotheses about the causes of discrimination, 
therefore, the dependent variable might be the number of units recommended or shown and the 
explanatory variables include average characteristics, such as neighborhood racial composition, 
over the set of available units. These studies therefore test hypotheses related to the 
characteristics of the advertised unit or to average characteristics of all units seen by either 
auditor. 
The information collected for HDS makes it possible to shift the unit of analysis from an 
audit to a housing unit. In particular, HDS indicates on the address of every house inspected by 
each auditor. This information makes it possible to determine which houses are inspected by 
both auditors, which are inspected only by the white auditor, and which are inspected only by the 
black or Hispanic auditor, and therefore results in a sample of inspected houses. 
This shift in the unit of analysis has three key advantages.2  First, this shift makes it 
possible to determine whether a real estate agents decision to withhold a house from a minority 
customer depends on the characteristics of that particular house and thereby adds new 
information for testing existing hypotheses about the causes of discrimination. This information 
includes whether the house is the one that was advertised in the newspaper and was the basis for 
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the audit; the physical characteristics of the house, such as the number of bedrooms it 
contains; and the characteristics of that houses neighborhood, such as its racial composition. 
Second, this shift makes it possible to determine whether a real estate agentss response 
to an initial housing request is different for minority and white customers. The houses in the 
sample include not only the units initially requested, provided they were shown to at least one 
auditor, but also other, similar units shown to one or both auditors by the agent. Consequently, 
we can observe whether housing agents show the same types of additional units to audit 
teammates, who make exactly the same initial request. In other words, we can discover whether 
agents responses to a given initial request depend on the race or ethnicity of the customer. 
Third, the shift to a unit-based analysis sheds light on the extent to which real estate 
agents tendency to show a house to any customer, black or white, depends on the characteristics 
of the house or its neighborhood. As a result, we are able to explore hypotheses about real estate 
agents marketing behavior, such as whether they practice redlining, defined as withholding 
from all customers houses located in integrated neighborhoods. No previous study has examined 
this type of behavior. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first two sections describe the Housing 
Discrimination Study and explain our new approach to studying discrimination in general terms. 
The third section outlines hypotheses about the causes of discrimination and demonstrates how 
to test them with audit data. The fourth through sixth sections present our econometric 
procedure, our data, and our estimation results. The final section summarizes our key findings. 
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The Housing Discrimination Study 
 
In the Housing Discrimination Study, each audit was conducted by two teammates, a 
white person and a member of a minority group.3  To ensure equal qualifications, teammates 
were matched according to sex and age, given the same training, assigned similar socioeconomic 
characteristics for the purposes of the audit, and sent to the same real estate agency within a short 
time of each other. After visiting an agency to inquire about the same advertised unit as well as 
similar available housing, teammates independently recorded what they were told and how they 
were treated. 
The HDS audits were conducted in 25 metropolitan areas, selected to allow valid 
estimates of unfavorable treatment in the United States. Black-white audits were conducted in 20 
areas and Hispanic-white audits were conducted in 13 areas (with both types of audits in 8 areas) 
during May through August 1989. Both sales and rental audits were conducted. Each audit was 
based on audit teammates’ inquiries about the availability of a housing unit mentioned in an 
advertisement randomly selected from the major metropolitan newspaper. Audit teammates were 
assigned incomes and family characteristics that made them qualified for this advertised unit. 
This paper is based on 1,081 black-white sales audits. For more details on HDS, see Yinger 
(1995). 
New federal anti-discrimination enforcement activities authorized by the 1988 Fair 
Housing Amendments Act have been implemented since the HDS data were collected, so these 
data may overstate the incidence of discrimination today. The available evidence does not 
support this possibility (see Yinger 1998). Even if discrimination has declined since 1989, 
however, there is no reason to believe that recent developments have altered the factors that lead 
housing agents to discriminate, which are the focus on this study. Moreover, no other data set 
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comes close to HDS in terms of providing the information needed to test hypotheses about the 
causes of discrimination—particularly the information for a unit-based approach. 
Structure of the Data Set 
 
Our objective in this paper is to test behavioral hypotheses about the determinants of real 
estate agents’ marketing behavior and about the causes of discrimination by real estate agents.  
Our investigation into the causes of discrimination draws on a large literature, discussed below, 
but many of our tests have different forms than do the tests in previous studies.  These forms are 
related to the nature of our unit-based data set.  In this section we describe this data set, focusing 
on the structure of the explanatory variables, and explain the various forms for our hypothesis 
tests.  In the following section we present new hypotheses about the determinants of agents’ 
marketing behavior, review existing hypotheses about the causes of discrimination, and describe 
the specific hypotheses that we test with our data. 
The Unit-Based Data Set 
Each HDS audit is based on a randomly selected advertisement.  Two auditors, one white 
and one black, separately visit the same real estate agency to inquire about the advertised unit 
and other similar units that might be available. Each auditor then records the address of every 
house or condominium that he or she inspected. We compared the addresses of housing units 
shown to the white and black teammates in a given audit to determine which units were shown to 
only one teammate and which units were shown to both.4  Our sample consists of the 2,465 
units—both advertised and other—shown to either teammate. 
The real estate agents have access to available housing units either in their files or 
through a multiple listing service (MLS), and they must decide which units to show each 
customer.  An audit study observes two decisions about each available unit:  whether the agent 
shows it to the white customer and whether he shows it to the black customer. These two 
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decisions result in four possible outcomes for each available housing unit and each audit team:  
the unit is shown to both customers, the unit is shown to the white customer only, the unit is 
shown to the black customer only, and the unit is not shown to either customer.  In a later 
section, we develop a multinomial logit model for analyzing these outcomes as a function of the 
(actual and assigned) characteristics of the auditor, the housing agency, the audit, and the 
housing unit, given that one outcome (the unit is not shown to either auditor) is never observed.  
In this section, we describe the data structure available for testing hypotheses about these agent 
decisions. 
For both marketing and discrimination, all of our hypotheses tests involve the impact of 
an explanatory variable on an agent’s decision to show a house to a customer.  Some of these 
explanatory variables, including auditor, agent, and agency characteristics have nothing to do 
with the housing unit.  These variables are listed in Table 1.  As shown below, hypothesis tests 
involving these variables are well known from previous studies and require no alterations for our 
unit-based data set.  Our study also brings in additional variables that are associated with the 
housing unit being shown.  These variables are listed in Table 2 and include whether the unit is 
the advertised unit, the asking price of the unit, physical characteristics of the unit, and 
information about the unit’s location, such as whether it is located in an integrated neighborhood 
or in the central city. 
To enrich our set of hypothesis tests, we use this information on housing unit 
characteristics to define four types of explanatory variables:  (1) the characteristics of the unit 
being shown, (2) the characteristics of the advertised unit that was initially requested by the 
auditor, (3) interactions between the characteristics of the unit being shown and whether that unit 
is the advertised unit, and (4) variables to represent the match between the unit being shown and 
the advertised unit on each housing characteristic. 
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These four types of variables are explained in detail in the first panel (i.e. the first four 
rows) of Table 3.  This panel shows how to calculate each type of variable for a unit 
characteristic that takes on the values of zero and one, using “whether the unit is located in an 
integrated area” as an example. This example involves an audit in which the advertised unit (unit 
1) is in an integrated area and in which two other units, one of which (unit 2) is in an integrated 
area, are shown to at least one auditor (so that we can observe them).  This audit yields three 
observations in our data set – one for each unit – as shown by the three columns in the table.  The 
first type of variable (the first row) measures a characteristic of the unit itself, so it takes on a 
value of 1 (= integrated area) for unit 1 and unit 2, but not for unit 3.  The second type of variable 
(the second row) measures a characteristic of the advertised unit associated with the relevant 
audit.  In this audit, the advertised unit is in an integrated area, so this variable takes a value of 1 
for all three observations.  The third type of variable describes a characteristics of the advertised 
unit, as well, but only applies when the observation is itself the advertised unit.5  In this example, 
therefore, this variable equals one for unit 1 and zero for the other two units.  The fourth type of 
variable compares the value of one housing characteristic for the advertised unit and for the unit 
that defines an observation.  This variable equals one by definition when the unit is the 
advertised unit.  As shown in the fourth row of Table 3, it also equals one for unit 2 in our 
example (because unit 2, like the advertised unit, is in an integrated area) but equals zero for unit 
3 (which is not in an integrated area). 
The second panel in Table 3 applies to a continuous housing characteristic, using asking 
price as an example.  The four types of variables in this panel are defined in a similar way.  The 
key difference arises in the construction of the fourth type of variable, namely the match between 
the unit being shown and the advertised unit.  When the unit characteristic is continuous, the 
match between the unit and the advertised unit is described using a spline based on whether the 
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unit has a value for this variable that is higher or lower than the value for the advertised unit.  
The spline values are shown in the last two rows of Table 3.  The use of this spline implies that 
the coefficient estimates for the characteristics of the unit being shown (type 1 variable) and the 
advertised unit (type 2 variable) are not both identified.  As a result, the unit characteristic 
variable is not shown in the second panel and is not included in the specification for continuous 
unit characteristics. 
The Form of Hypotheses Concerning Marketing 
The four types of explanatory variables lead to four forms for hypotheses tests 
concerning marketing.  These four forms are given in the first column of Table 4.  To begin, the 
characteristics of the unit being shown lead to hypotheses of the following form:  the decision to 
show a unit depends on the characteristics of that unit, or, to put it another way, agents are more 
likely to show some types of units than others.   The characteristics of the advertised unit lead to 
hypotheses of a different form, namely, that marketing depends on the customer’s initial request.  
Hypotheses associated with the third type of explanatory variable indicate that marketing is 
different for advertised units, which, in the audit context, are the units initially requested, than 
for other units, which my or may not have been advertised by the agent.  Finally, hypotheses 
associated with the fourth type of variable take yet another form, namely, that agent marketing 
behavior for a housing unit depends on the match between that unit and the unit initially 
requested. 
The Form of Hypotheses Concerning Discrimination 
To test hypotheses about the causes of discrimination, one more dimension must be 
added to the data structure.  To be specific, the variables defined in Table 2 must be interacted 
with the minority status of the auditor, thereby creating four more types of variables.  These 
variables make it possible to determine whether the impact of a housing unit’s characteristics on 
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an agent’s decision to show the unit is the same for minority and white auditors.  The forms for 
the resulting hypotheses tests are indicated in the second column of Table 2.  Characteristics of 
the unit that defines an observation interacted with minority status yield hypotheses of the 
following form:  discrimination in showing a unit depends on the characteristics of the unit.  As 
indicated in the other entries in this column, the other three forms of interaction variable yield 
different forms of hypotheses, namely, discrimination depends on the initial request, 
discrimination is different for the advertised unit, or discrimination depends on the match 
between a unit and the auditor’s initial request. 
 
Hypotheses About The Decision to Show a Housing Unit 
 
We now turn to the specific hypotheses that we test in our estimations.  We first consider 
hypotheses related to the marketing of housing units in general and then turn to hypotheses 
concerning discrimination. 
Hypotheses Concerning Marketing 
The shift to a unit-based data set opens the door to testing hypotheses about marketing 
behavior by real estate agents that does not involve discrimination. This type of test is possible 
because the unit-based data set involves two observations for each housing unit, one for each 
audit teammate, and it is possible to determine whether units are more likely to be shown to both 
teammates than to a single teammate, irrespective of race, under some circumstances. 
Although this type of behavior does not involve discrimination on the basis of a 
customer’s race, it has the potential to shed light on discrimination in two ways. First, it can 
reveal whether real estate agents respond to incentives that are not connected to the minority 
status of a customer. Any finding that they do so increases the plausibility of a finding that they 
respond to similar incentives directly related to a customer’s minority status. Second, one kind of 
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marketing behavior, redlining against houses in integrated areas, has a discriminatory dimension 
even though it applies equally to black and white customers. Our approach makes it possible to 
observe this type of behavior, which is illegal under the Fair Housing Act.6 
As noted in the introduction, our principal hypothesis about marketing is that real estate 
agents make inferences about a customer’s preferences on the basis of his or her initial 
housing request and then, to maximize the probability of a successful match, concentrate on 
showing the customer houses that best match these inferred preferences.  We explore this 
hypothesis with two types of tests.  First, we test the hypothesis that a housing agent is more 
likely to show a unit if it is the advertised unit, that is, the unit about which the customer 
inquired.  This test, which takes the form defined in row 3 of Table 2, is not a very strong test, 
however, because it cannot rule out three other hypotheses, namely, that housing agents only 
advertise units they want to show, that agents behave differently when they know a customer is 
aware that a unit is for sale, or that agents are more likely to show houses they advertise because 
other houses might be taken from a multiple listing service, in which case the commission would 
have to be shared with the listing agent.7  
Second, we test the hypothesis that agents are more likely to show units that match the 
unit about which the auditor inquired than they are to show units that differ from this advertised 
unit in some way.  This type of test, which takes the form defined in row 4 of Table 2, can be 
applied to any housing characteristic in Table 3.  For example, we test the hypotheses that agents 
are less likely to show a unit that differs from the advertised unit in terms of asking price, 
number of bedrooms, type of neighborhood, and whether it is new.  Note that the HDS auditors 
were instructed not to explicitly reveal any neighborhood preferences.  Nevertheless, real estate 
agents may interpret the neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located as an indication of 
the auditor’s neighborhood preferences.  As a result, we can test this inferred-preference 
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hypothesis by determining whether both blacks and whites are more likely to be shown a unit 
located in the type of neighborhood (white or integrated) that matches the neighborhood of the 
advertised unit than a unit located in another type of neighborhood. 
A second hypothesis builds on the fact that real estate agents are paid a percentage of 
the sales price.  Under the assumption that the cost of selling a house is not related (or only 
weakly related) to house value, this feature of the housing market leads to the prediction that 
agents will work harder (that is, be more likely to show units) for customers that inquire about 
more show more expensive houses, which yield a higher net commission.  We test this 
hypothesis by determining whether the probability that an agent will show a house increases with 
the advertised unit’s asking price.  This test takes the form defined by the second row of Table 2.  
A third hypothesis is that some agents practice redlining, defined as an unwillingness to 
show houses in integrated neighborhoods to any customers, regardless of their minority status.  
This type of behavior could arise because agents believe that lenders and home insurance 
companies practice redlining against these neighborhoods (see Schill and Wachter 1993) and 
want to avoid wasting time showing houses that are unlikely to sell. This neighborhood-
discrimination hypothesis is supported by Galster, Freiberg, and Houk (1987), Newburger 
(1995), and Turner (1992), who find that houses located in minority neighborhoods are less 
likely than houses in white neighborhoods to be advertised in the newspaper or marketed through 
an open house.  It also could arise, however, because agents have had trouble finding buyers for 
houses in integrated neighborhoods in the past or because they simply want to avoid working in 
such neighborhoods.  Our data set does not allow us to determine which of these incentives is at 
work, but it does allow us to test the hypothesis that redlining exists. 
Finally, we test three hypotheses about the nature of the marketing process.  First, we 
test the hypothesis that new houses are less likely to be shown because they are often part of a 
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housing development containing similar houses that is marketed through a model home or 
through the house that is the most convenient to show.  This test has the first form in Table 2.  
Second, we test the hypothesis that agents try to conserve their driving time.  We test this 
hypothesis with a variable to measure the distance between a unit and the advertised unit, a test 
that takes the fourth form in Table 2.  Third, we test the hypothesis that different real estate 
agents in the same agency select different houses to show.  We test this hypothesis using a 
variable in Table 1, namely, whether both auditors encountered the same real estate agent; if our 
hypothesis is correct, a unit is more likely to be shown when the same agent is encountered. 
Hypotheses Tests Concerning Discrimination 
We now turn to hypotheses and hypotheses tests concerning the causes of discrimination.  
Our objective is to gain insight into the reasons that real estate agents withhold units from black 
customers.  The hypotheses in this section are all based on some form of belief or perception by 
real estate agents.  Because these beliefs and perceptions are not observed, all of our hypothesis 
tests are indirect, that is, they determine whether discrimination is more likely under 
circumstances that are associated with a particular belief or perception.  Existing audit studies 
test hypotheses about the causes of discrimination by determining whether differences in 
treatment between minority and white auditors are associated with auditor, agent, or audit 
characteristics, such as those in Table 1.  See Galster (1990b), Ondrich, Stricker, and Yinger 
(1998, 1999), Page (1995), Roychoudhury and Goodman (1992, 1994), or Yinger (1995).  In this 
section, we review the three main hypotheses and associated tests in the literature and present 
additional hypothesis tests made possible by a unit-based data set.  These three hypotheses about 
the causes of discrimination are not mutually exclusive, and most studies find that more than one 
cause is at work.  Moreover, as we will see, it is difficult to identify tests that distinguish the 
effects of one hypothesis from that of another. 
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The agent-prejudice hypothesis, which is based on Becker (1971), states that housing 
agents discriminate because of their own personal prejudice.  Like previous studies, we test this 
hypothesis by determining whether discrimination is influenced by variables that are likely to be 
correlated with prejudice.  In particular, we look at four such variables in Table 1:  the race, age, 
and sex of the real estate agent and the sex of the auditor.  Black agents are presumably less 
prejudiced against black customers than are white agents, on average, so a finding that black 
agents are less likely to discriminate supports this hypothesis.  In addition, prejudice is higher in 
older cohorts than in younger cohorts, men  tend to be more prejudiced than women, and agents 
may be more averse to dealing with black men than black women.8  Thus, we can test the agent 
prejudice hypothesis by determining whether discrimination is higher when the agent is older or 
male and when the auditor is male. 
Another test of the agent-prejudice hypothesis is based on the assumption that one can 
make inferences about an agent’s prejudice by the houses he accepts as listings. This assumption 
leads to the prediction that an agent who advertises a listing in a black or integrated 
neighborhood, where some of his customers are more likely to be black or Hispanic, will be less 
likely to discriminate.  This test takes the second form in Table 2. 
The white-customer-prejudice hypothesis says that housing agents discriminate to 
protect their actual or potential business with prejudiced white customers.9  Our data allow us to 
carry out several tests of this hypothesis.  First, we can look for evidence that agents who draw 
business from a largely white area are more likely to discriminate than are agents who work in 
minority neighborhoods. Although we cannot directly observe the location of an agent’s 
business, we can approximate this location by observing the location of the advertised unit.  
Thus, this hypothesis leads to the same prediction as the previous one, namely that 
discrimination will be higher when an agent advertises a unit in a white neighborhood. 
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Second, we can determine whether discrimination is relatively high in integrated 
neighborhoods in the central city, where the introduction of a few minority households could 
result in tipping, and thereby drive away the agent’s existing contacts (a test with the first form in 
Table 2).  (This prediction does not hold for integrated areas in the suburbs, which tend to be far 
from established black areas so that they are unlikely to be threatened by tipping.)  Third, this 
hypothesis indicates that larger real estate agencies, which have a broader customer base, are less 
likely to discriminate than smaller agencies, which may depend on obtaining customers from 
particular neighborhoods.  Another test of this hypothesis, therefore, one based on a variable in 
Table 1, is whether larger firms are less likely to discriminate than smaller firms.10 
A fourth prediction of this hypothesis is that real estate agents may decide not to work 
with black customers who express a preference for living in a neighborhood where their presence 
would threaten the agent’s established business.  This hypothesis would be supported, therefore, 
by a finding that agents are more likely to discriminate when a black customer requests to see a 
unit in an integrated area in the central city (a test of the second form in Table 2).   Finally, this 
hypothesis predicts that housing agents might treat married black customers better than single 
black customers on the grounds that their potential white customers would rather not have black 
single people as neighbors.  This is a very weak test, however, because over 90 percent of the 
auditors played the role of a spouse (see Table 1) and this prediction is also consistent with other 
hypotheses.11 
The third hypothesis is that real estate agents practice statistical discrimination. This 
type of discrimination is well known in the case of employment (Arrow 1972; Cain 1986; Phelps 
1972) and lending (Ladd 1998; Yinger 1995).  In the case of housing, a few authors have 
proposed a “perceived preference” hypothesis that is equivalent to statistical discrimination, but 
this equivalence is not widely recognized and statistical discrimination has not been emphasized 
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in studies of the marketing of houses.12  In general, statistical discrimination is said to exist if an 
economic agent treats people in different groups differently because the agent believes that (a) it 
is profitable to base treatment on some unobserved characteristic and (b) this characteristic 
differs across groups.13  These beliefs might be accurate, in which case statistical discrimination 
is profitable (but still illegal) or it might be based on an inaccurate stereotype, and therefore lead 
to unprofitable behavior.14  Any difference in housing marketing based on minority status, 
including statistical discrimination, is illegal according to the Fair Housing Act.15 
Our unit-based data set makes it possible to test for statistical discrimination in a variety 
of ways.  First, statistical discrimination might be linked to unit or neighborhood characteristics 
(tests of the first form in Table 2).  Two tests of this type are particularly compelling.  The first 
test involves the asking price of a unit.  In particular, real estate agents may assume that black 
customers are unlikely to be able to buy relatively expensive houses.  Despite the fact that audit 
teammates are equally qualified, therefore, agents’ may wasting time on transactions perceived 
to be unlikely by refusing to show higher-priced units to blacks.16  A finding that discrimination 
increases with asking price therefore is consistent with the existence of statistical discrimination.  
Note that agents’ preconception in this case could take the form of a believe that black 
customers, unlike white customers, are unlikely to be qualified for expensive houses, even if they 
explicitly ask to see them, or a belief that the more expensive the housing the more likely it is 
that blacks will encounter discrimination from lenders or home insurance companies.17  In either 
case, acting on the basis of this preconception constitutes statistical discrimination because it 
involves using a perceived average trait for a group to predict an outcome for an individual 
member of that group. 
The second type of test involves neighborhood characteristics.  Real estate agents might 
believe, for example, that all households prefer to live with members of their own race and that a 
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housing transaction is unlikely to be completed when a black customer is matched to a white 
neighborhood or a white customer is matched to a black or integrated neighborhood.  This 
statistical discrimination based on preconceived preferences predicts that blacks are more likely 
to encounter discrimination when a housing unit is in a white area than when it is in a black or 
integrated area.18  This type of agent behavior is called steering.  Note that this prediction is 
different from that of the customer-prejudice hypothesis, so this test provides a way to 
differentiate between these two causes of discrimination.   
Real estate agents may also believe that lenders are unwilling to approve a mortgage (or 
insurance companies to provide home insurance) when the race or ethnicity of a customer does 
not match that of the neighborhood where the relevant house is located.  Because a transaction 
cannot proceed without a mortgage (and home insurance), agents may want to avoid investing 
time showing houses where the race or ethnicity of the customer and neighborhood do not match.  
Our test, namely, whether discrimination is higher in white than in integrated areas, cannot 
identify the source of real estate agents’ perceptions about the likelihood of transactions in 
various types of neighborhoods, but it can determine whether their behavior involves 
neighborhood-based steering, as predicted by the statistical discrimination hypothesis.19 
Finally, statistical discrimination could be reflected in the way agents respond to a 
customer’s initial request.  This possibility leads to a series of tests that take the fourth form in 
Table 2; that is, we determine whether discrimination depends on the match between a unit and 
the unit initially requested.  The strongest of these tests, in our view, concerns the possibility that 
for blacks, but not for whites, a unit is more likely to be shown if its value is below that of the 
advertised unit.  A finding of this type is consistent with the view that real estate agents expect 
blacks, but not whites, to request more expensive units than they can afford and that agents then 
act upon this belief – a form of statistical discrimination.20 
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Other tests of this type concern the match between the other characteristics of a unit or its 
neighborhoods and those of the advertised unit.  A request to see a unit in an expensive 
neighborhood, for example, might be accepted as an indication of neighborhood preferences for 
a white customer but rejected for a black customer because of a preconception about the types of 
neighborhoods blacks prefer.  Acting on such a belief, that is, refusing to show houses in 
expensive neighborhoods to blacks even when they are requested, is a form of statistical 
discrimination.  Because our regressions hold housing price constant, these results must be 
interpreted with care.  A different agent response the same initial request by whites and blacks 
suggests that agents believe blacks and whites have different trade-offs across housing 
characteristics – despite the contrary information in their initial request.  The agent behavior just 
described, for example, is consistent with a belief on the part of agents that blacks, but not 
whites, would be willing to save money by living in a neighborhood with low average house 
values in exchange for some other housing or neighborhood characteristics of equal market 
value.  
 
Estimation Technique 
 
A sales audit involves two visits to a real estate agency and has two critical properties. 
First, even after controlling for observable variables, the outcomes for the two visits are not 
independent because the auditors are paired on unrecorded characteristics, receive similar 
training, are sent to the same real estate agency at about the same time, and are instructed to 
inquire about the same advertised unit. Second, for every relevant unit that is available in that 
agency, four outcomes are possible:  the unit is shown to both auditors, the unit is shown to the 
white auditor only, the unit is shown to the black auditor only, or the unit is not shown to either 
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auditor. A unit can appear in our sample only if it falls into one of the first three cases, so we 
face a selection bias in the sample of observed units.21    
A simple solution to this sample selection problem is available if the error terms for the 
different choices are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a Weibull 
distribution.  In this case, the four-choice problem can be characterized as a multinomial logit 
model, which has the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property (Boersch-Supan, 
1987).  This property is that the ratio of the probabilities (or relative odds) of any two outcomes 
does not depend on the presence of characteristics of a third outcome.  In a multivariate context, 
the IIA property implies that the coefficient estimates for one choice relative to a second can be 
estimated consistently even though data associated with the third choice is missing from the 
sample.   
To implement this solution, we must solve two methodological problems:  potential 
correlation between the choices and interpretation of the estimated coefficients.  The 
independence assumption is implausible in the context of a fair housing audit.  The two auditors 
are assigned to the same real estate agency, given the same training, and told to inquire about the 
same advertised unit within a short time interval.  This paired structure creates a correlation 
between the unobserved determinants of showing the unit to the minority auditor and showing 
the unit to the white auditor.  To solve this problem, that is, to ensure that the error terms are not 
correlated across choices, our statistical model includes a specification for the unobservable 
attributes that are associated with a test, such as the real estate agency or advertised unit.22  The 
independence assumption is only imposed upon the error terms that remain after controlling for 
the heterogeneity associated with an audit and with the participating auditors.23 
The interpretation problem arises because coefficients cannot be estimated relative to the 
choice that is omitted from the sample.  As a result, we can estimate the effect of observable unit 
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attributes on the decision to show a unit to a white and not a minority auditor relative to the 
decision to show the unit to both auditors, but we cannot estimate the effect of this attribute on 
the decision to show a unit to a white and not a minority auditor relative to the decision not to 
show the unit to either.  The structure of a housing audit provides a solution to this limitation.  
Specifically, auditors make independent visits to the same real estate agency, and the real estate 
agent is unaware of any connection between the visits.  After controlling for the common effect 
of being assigned to the same real estate agent and same advertised unit, the model describing 
treatment during each tester’s visit can be described independently of the model for the other 
visit.  See Ondrich, Ross and Yinger (2000) and Kenny and Wissoker (1994) for examples of this 
approach.  This structure results in models describing the treatment of the white and minority 
auditors, respectively, and these two models can be estimated when information is available on 
only three of the four possible outcomes. 
 The econometric analysis builds on two indicator variables, WY  and BY , for each unit that 
the agency has available. ( )W BY Y  equals one if the unit is shown to the white (black) auditor. 
Conditional on relevant covariates and an unobserved audit-specific effect for each auditor, the 
probabilities of a unit being shown take the simple binary logit form: 
 
{ } { }
{ } { }
( 1 , , , ) ( 1 , )
exp / exp 1
( 1 , , , ) ( 1 , )
exp ( ) / exp ( ) 1 ,
W W B W B W W W
W W W W
B W B W B B B B
B B B B
P Y Z Z P Y Z
Z Z
P Y Z Z P Y Z
Z Z
= θ θ = = θ
 ′ ′= θ + β θ + β +  
= θ θ = = θ
 ′ ′= θ + β+ δ θ + β+ δ +  
 (1) 
where ( )W BZ Z  is a column vector of observed characteristics of the white (black) auditor and 
her visit, the unit itself, the advertised unit, and the real estate agent and agency; β  is the vector 
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of coefficients associated with WZ ; δ  gives the difference in the coefficient vectors of blacks 
and whites; and ( )W Bθ θ  is the unobserved effect for the white (black) auditor. 
 The correlation problem is addressed by controlling for the testing process that creates 
the correlation in the first place.  Namely, after controlling explicitly for audit effects, there is 
assumed to be no source of correlation between the choices, and conditional on WZ , BZ , Wθ , 
and Bθ , the random variables WY  and BY  for each unit are assumed to be statistically 
independent. The probabilities for the four possible joint events are: 
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{ }
{ }
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( 0, 1 , , , ) exp ( ) /
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 (2) 
where 
 { } { } { }exp ( ) exp exp ( ) 1.W W B B W W B BD Z Z Z Z′ ′ ′ ′= θ + β+ θ + β+ δ + θ + β + θ + β+ δ +  (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) define a four-choice multinomial logit model of real estate agent behavior 
for each unit available to the agent. 
Note that the model for the choice to allow both auditors to see the unit is simply the sum 
of the models to allow only the white or only the minority auditor to see the unit.  In a standard 
model, such as the bivariate probit, this restriction identifies the correlation between the choice 
unobservables, but in our model with its missing choice, this restriction results in treatment 
coefficients (βand δ) that are exactly identified.  We do not need to estimate a correlation directly 
because the potential correlation between choice unobservables is captured by the auditor effects.   
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 This four-choice multinomial logit model cannot be estimated in the usual manner 
because no units for which the agent chooses the fourth outcome in (2) namely ( 0, 0)W BY Y= =  
appear in the data set. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the first three probabilities in (2) for the 
sample selection criterion. Letting S be the indicator for sample selection, the sample selection 
probability is given by 
 ( 1 , , , ) 1 ( 0, 0 , , , ) ( 1) / .W B W B W B W B W BP S Z Z P Y Y Z Z D D= θ θ = − = = θ θ = −  (4) 
Conditional on 1S = , joint probabilities for the three outcomes observed in the data are: 
 
{ }
{ }
{ }
( 1, 1 1, , , , ) exp ( ) /( 1)
( 1, 0 1, , , , ) exp /( 1)
( 0, 1 1, , , , ) exp ( ) /( 1).
W B W B W B W W B B
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′= = = θ θ = θ + β+ δ −
 (5) 
Equation (5) defines a three-choice multinomial logit model. Because the random effects are 
unobserved, the conditional probabilities in a standard likelihood function cannot be evaluated 
for given values of the parameters.  
The panel nature of the unit sample provides the necessary information to control for the 
audit effects.  The estimator follows a standard three-choice multinomial logit form within a test.  
The joint likelihood function can be evaluated for all units in a test at any value of the pair (θW, 
θB), and the pair can be integrated out over its joint distribution.  The distribution of the pair in 
the estimated model is based on the Heckman-Singer (1984) non-parametric mixing 
distribution.24 
 
Data 
 
 Our HDS unit-based data set is described in Tables 3 and 4, which presents means and 
standard deviations for all variables except location and time dummies. The neighborhood data 
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in Table 4 is based on the 1990 Census, which was neither available for the HDS reports nor 
used for any previous research based on HDS data.25  This table reveals, for example, that the 
average asking price was $137,805, that 45.0 percent of the units were advertised units, and that 
17.9 percent of the units were in integrated neighborhoods. We define an integrated 
neighborhood as a census tract with a population more than 15 percent black. This may seem like 
a low percentage for such a dividing line, but few houses in the HDS data set are located in 
neighborhoods that are heavily integrated or predominantly black (see Turner and Mickelsons 
1992).26  Moreover, as shown below, the 15 percent dividing line has explanatory power. 
 Estimates of the incidence of discrimination are presented in Tables 5 through 7. These 
tables also provide hints about the variables that might influence when discrimination takes 
place. Formal, multivariate hypothesis tests are presented below. Each table contains five 
columns of sample statistics. The first column gives the number of observations in the relevant 
subsample. The second column indicates the probability that a unit is shown to both the white 
and black auditor. This probability, along with all other probabilities in these tables, is weighted 
to account for the HDS sampling plan (see Urban Institute 1991). The third column indicates the 
probability that a unit is shown to the white but not the black auditor, which is the probability 
that the white is favored, and the fourth column shows the probability that the black is favored. 
The difference between columns (3) and (4) is called the net incidence of adverse treatment, 
which is widely used as a measure of discrimination. 
 Panel A of Table 5 shows that the net incidence of adverse treatment for the entire sample 
is 12.6 percent. The other panels reveal that this net incidence is by no means the same under all 
circumstances. Table 6 examines differences in adverse treatment based on a unit’s 
neighborhood characteristics. This table does not reveal any clear patterns. Somewhat 
surprisingly, for example, net incidence is not much different in white and integrated 
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neighborhoods. Table 7 investigates whether adverse treatment depends on the match between 
the unit being shown and the advertised unit. The closeness of the match appears to matter. For 
example, net adverse treatment is high for units that are more expensive (panel A) or in more 
expensive neighborhoods (panel B) than the advertised unit. 
Results Concerning Agent Marketing  
 The first column of Table 8 and Table 9 present the results of our hypotheses tests 
concerning agent marketing behavior.  In almost every case, we find support for the hypotheses 
developed earlier.  First, the evidence in Table 9 strongly supports the view that housing agents 
interpret a customer’s initial request as an indication of his or her preferences and then act upon 
that interpretation in showing houses.  Advertised units are more likely to be shown than other 
units (row 1, first column).  Agents are less likely to show a unit that has either more or fewer 
bedrooms than the advertised unit (row 3, third and fourth columns) or that is a neighborhood 
with more or less old housing than the neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located (row 
5, third and fourth columns).27  One puzzling result that seems to cut the other way is that agents 
are less likely to show central city units when a customer requests a unit in the central city (row 
9, third column).  This effect is weaker for the advertised unit itself (row 9, fifth column), 
however, which suggests that agents are responding to inferred preferences, but also to some 
unidentified incentive related to location in the central city. 
 Second, we find evidence that agents respond to the economic incentive created by a 
percentage commission.  To be specific, the higher the asking price of the advertised unit, the 
more likely it is that any unit will be shown (row 2, second column).  Interestingly, however, this 
result does not hold for the advertised unit itself (row 2, fifth column), which suggests that the 
incentive to increase marketing effort as asking price increases is offset by the incentive to 
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increase marketing effort on units that match the customer’s inferred preferences, which the 
advertised unit does by definition. 
 Third, we find evidence to support two of our three hypotheses about housing marketing.  
Agents are less likely to show a house that is new instead of old, particularly if it is the 
advertised unit (row 7, first and last columns); however, new houses other than the advertised 
unit are no less likely to be shown if the customer asked to see a unit that is new (row 7, third 
column, significant at the 10 percent level).  The first two results support the view that agents 
market through model homes in new developments, whereas the last result shows inferred 
preferences at work; when a customer inquires about a new unit, other new units, not just model 
units or convenient units, are shown at the same rate as are older units.  We also find that units 
are more likely to be shown when both auditors see the same agent (see Table 8).  This result 
indicates, as explained earlier, that different agents choose to show different units.  Finally, we 
find no evidence that agents consider the distance between units in making their showing 
decisions (Table 9, row 13). 
 Finally, the results in Table 9 support the hypothesis that agents practice redlining against 
integrated neighborhoods (row 10, first column), but only in suburbs, not in central cities (row 
14, first column).28  Moreover, we find that redlining does not arise when the agent can infer 
from the auditor’s request that the auditor prefers an integrated area (row 10, third column).  
Hence, these results are consistent with both redlining and behavior based on inferred 
preferences.  Another sign of redlining is that agents are more likely to withhold advertised units 
if they are in white neighborhoods that are close to integrated neighborhoods (row 11, fifth 
column).29 
 To provide more insight into the complex relationship between neighborhood 
characteristics and agent marketing behavior, Tables 11 and 12 sum the relevant coefficients to 
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show net effects for advertised and non-advertised units in various neighborhood situations 
compared to units in white, suburban neighborhoods.30  These tables also present t-statistics and 
the number of observations in each cell. Table 11 shows that advertised units are about evenly 
split between central cities and suburbs, but are more likely to be located in white than in 
integrated areas. The coefficients suggest that advertised units are marketed less strenuously if 
they are in the central city or in an integrated neighborhood, but only the effect for suburban 
integrated neighborhoods is statistically significant (at the 10 percent level). Although this result 
is not highly significant, it is striking to find evidence that agents are likely to steer a customer 
away from a unit in an integrated neighborhood even when she explicitly asks to see it. 
 Table 12 provides corresponding results for non-advertised units. This table is more 
complicated than Table 11 because outcomes for non-advertised units depend on outcomes for 
the advertised unit. Three results stand out in this table. First, the table confirms the role of 
inferred preferences concerning integrated neighborhoods.31  In every case, the probability that a 
unit will be shown is higher if it is in the same type of neighborhood, white or integrated, as the 
advertised unit. Specifically, the entries in the first row (both units in integrated areas) are always 
larger than the corresponding entries in the second row (only the inspected unit in an integrated 
area) and the entries in the fourth row (both units in white areas) are always larger than the 
corresponding entries in the third row (only the inspected unit in a white area). 
 Second, Table 12 strengthens the conclusion that agents are more likely to withhold units 
in suburban, integrated neighborhoods. The strongest result, in the last column of the first row, 
indicates that auditors are significantly less likely to be shown units in integrated than in white 
neighborhoods even if they inquire about just such a unit. The coefficients in the last two 
columns of the second row are also negative and significant (one at only the 10 percent level); 
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these results could reflect either inferred preferences or differential treatment of integrated 
neighborhoods.  
 Third, the results in Table 12 confirm that, contrary to the prediction of inferred 
preferences, a non-advertised unit in the central city is less likely to be shown when the 
advertised unit is in the central city than when it is in the suburbs. In fact, the entries in the 
second column are all statistically indistinguishable from zero, whereas three of the entries in the 
first column are negative and significant.32  The negative, significant coefficients in the last row 
of the first column provide evidence that agents are more likely to withhold units in central city 
neighborhoods; even when a customer inquires about a unit in a white neighborhood in the 
central city, she is unlikely to be shown other units in such neighborhoods. This type of behavior, 
which is not illegal, could arise if agents believe central city neighborhoods, unlike suburban 
ones, are very different from each other and interpret an auditor’s initial query as a preference for 
the particular neighborhood in which the advertised unit is located, not for the central city in 
general. In this case, other central city units are unlikely to be in the same or similar 
neighborhoods and therefore are relatively unlikely to be shown. 
 Given the small sample sizes involved, the results in the second and third columns of 
Table 12 should be interpreted with caution. However, one possible explanation is consistent 
with the existence of inferred preferences. Because almost no central city units are shown to 
either auditor when the initial request involves a unit in the suburbs, the central city units that are 
shown may have unobserved features that make them similar enough to the customer’s request to 
be worth showing;33 in fact, judging from the small, insignificant coefficients in the second 
column, these units are just as worth showing as units in white suburbs, the omitted category.  
Thus, these coefficient estimates may reflect the impact of the unobserved features, not the 
impact of inferred preferences. Ironically, therefore, agents’ decisions to withhold units in 
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response to inferred preferences may make it impossible for us to observe other responses to 
inferred preferences with our data.  This same phenomenon could explain why the coefficients in 
the third column are not significantly different from those in the fourth column. 
Results Concerning Discrimination 
 Results concerning discrimination can be found in the second column of Table 8 and in 
Table 10.  These results provide no support for the agent prejudice hypothesis.   Table 8 shows 
that discrimination does not depend on the race, age, or sex or the agent or the sex of the auditor.  
Table 10 shows that discrimination does not depend on an agent’s revealed willingness to 
advertise a unit in or near an integrated area (rows 10 and 11, second column).  These results do 
not, of course, prove that agent prejudice is not at work; instead they might indicate that our data 
set does not include any variables that allow us to isolate the effects of agent prejudice. 
In contrast, several results support the white-customer-prejudice hypothesis.34  To be 
specific, Table 8 shows that discrimination increases with the size of the agency and is higher for 
married than for single blacks.  Moreover, Table 10 indicates that discrimination is relatively 
high in central city, integrated areas, which are the ones most likely to be threatened with tipping 
(rows 10 and 14, first column).35  These results are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies, but they are certainly not definitive.  Two of the results are based on imperfect proxies 
(agents encountered as a measure of agency size and central city integrated areas as a measure of 
neighborhoods most likely to tip) and, as noted earlier, the third is consistent with other 
hypotheses, as well. 
Table 10 also provides three types of results that support the hypothesis that agents 
practice statistical discrimination.  First, discrimination increases with the advertised unit’s 
asking price (row 2, second column).36  Combined with the comparable result in Table 9, this 
result implies that agents’ marketing efforts increase with asking price for whites, but not for 
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blacks, an implication that is consistent with the hypothesis that agents practice statistical 
discrimination based on a preconception about the ability of black customers to purchase 
expensive homes. 
Second, we find less discrimination in integrated areas than in white areas (row 10, 
column 1).  As explained earlier, this result is consistent with the view that agents try to 
maximize the chances of a successful match by making race-based assumptions about a 
customer’s preferences, which is a form of statistical discrimination.  Note that the coefficient for 
integrated areas is not as large in absolute value as the analogous coefficient in Table 9, which 
implies that houses in suburban integrated neighborhoods are less likely than houses in other 
types of neighborhoods to be shown to either blacks or whites. In combination, these results 
imply that real estate agents practice both redlining and steering.37  The difference between the 
estimates in Tables 9 and 10 (i.e. -2.5751 + 0.5957 = 1.9794) therefore provides an estimate of 
redlining and the result in Table 10 (0.5957) provides an estimate of steering – the result 
consistent with statistical discrimination. 
 This result is confirmed by a table analogous to Table 12 but for the neighborhood 
variables interacted with race.  This table, which is not presented here, reveals that when the 
advertised unit is in a suburban white neighborhood, agents are significantly less likely 
(coefficient = 0.596, t-statistic = 2.15) to withhold units in suburban neighborhoods from black 
than from white customers.   In other words, a request for a unit in a white suburban 
neighborhood is more likely to be interpreted as an indication of a customer’s preferences when 
the customer is white than when she is black, a result consistent with statistical discrimination.   
These results do not carry over to integrated neighborhoods in central cities (row 14, 
column 1).  In this case, the measure of redlining is much smaller, 1.0751  (= -2.5751 +1.8306 + 
0.5957 - 0.9263), and the measure of steering, -0.3306 (= 0.5957 - 0.9263) actually has the 
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opposite sign, which implies that blacks are steered away from integrated areas.  This is the 
result that supports the white-customer-prejudice hypothesis.  Overall, therefore, our test based 
on neighborhood integration does not provide a clear-cut acceptance of one hypothesis over 
another, but instead supports statistical discrimination in the suburbs and white customer 
prejudice in the central city.  
 Third, we find that in several cases agents’ responses to an initial housing query are 
different for black and white customers.  The most striking result of this type involves asking 
price:  for blacks, but not for whites, a unit is more likely to be shown if its value is below that of 
the advertised unit (row 2, fourth column).  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
agents practice statistical discrimination on the basis of the perception that blacks, but not whites, 
request more expensive units than they can afford. 
 Two other results of this type involve neighborhood characteristics.  In particular, agents 
increase their marketing efforts for blacks if a unit is in a neighborhood that has an average 
house value below (row 4, fourth column) or has less old housing than (row 5, fourth column) 
the advertised unit’s neighborhood.  Neighborhoods with low average values and low shares of 
old housing are likely to be the least established neighborhoods, in the first case because of high 
turnover and in the second case because they are new.  These results suggest, therefore, that 
housing agents believe, despite the contrary information they receive in an audit context, that 
blacks, unlike whites, want to live in neighborhoods that are not well established, perhaps to 
avoid clashing with entrenched white residents.38  Acting on this belief, as agents appear to do, is 
another form of statistical discrimination.  
 The final result of this type is that agents are more likely to show a non-advertised unit to 
blacks if both it and the advertised unit have some problems (row 8, third and fifth columns).39  
Agents do not go out of their way to show units with problems to blacks, but they are more likely 
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to show these units to blacks when the initial request indicates a willingness to consider a house 
with some problems. This type of request has no impact on the treatment of a white auditor (see 
Table 9), but it appears to confirm agents’ stereotypes about black customers and therefore leads 
agents’ to show other units with problems to blacks. Thus, this result provides further evidence 
of statistical discrimination, as agents treat blacks and whites differently based on preconceptions 
about what customers from different racial groups prefer. 
 Although these tests are indirect, they provide extensive support for they hypothesis that 
real estate agents practice statistical discrimination.  To put it another way, we know of no other 
explanation for the clear link between discrimination and particular housing characteristics, such 
as asking price or neighborhood integration, or between discrimination and the unit/advertised 
unit match.  
 One might also ask whether the effects found here are large in magnitude, as well as 
statistically significant. Table 13, which focuses on discrimination in non-advertised units, 
provides an answer. The results in the first row yield the breakdown of outcomes for our actual 
sample of non-advertised units. This row indicates that 9.1 percent of these units were shown to 
both auditors, 54.4 percent were shown to the white auditor only, and 36.5 percent were shown 
to the black auditor only, for a net incidence of 17.9 percent (= 54.4 – 36.5). Every unit appears 
in a single audit, and every audit is defined by an advertised unit. The second row eliminates all 
differences between non-advertised units and the advertised unit that defines its audit. This 
baseline case predicts treatment for a non-advertised unit that has the average characteristics of 
the advertised units in our sample and that is identical (in terms of observable characteristics) to 
the advertised unit that defines the audit. For two tract variables, namely whether the tract is in 
the central city or in an integrated neighborhood, we define this baseline case using the mode, 
not the mean. The modal category is a unit in a white, suburban tract. The second row of 
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Table 13 indicates that, for a baseline unit defined in this way, our estimates predict a 50.8 
percent chance that the unit will be shown to the white auditor only and a 27.0 percent chance 
that it will be shown to the black auditor only, for a predicted net incidence of 23.8 percent. 
 The third and fourth rows use our estimates to determine how the baseline estimate would 
change if the asking price of a unit goes up or down by one standard deviation, holding constant 
the asking price of the advertised unit. Raising the asking price has little impact on the net 
measure (third row), but lowering the asking price lowers the predicted net incidence of 
discrimination by almost 30 percent, from 23.8 percent (row 2) to 17.3 percent (row 4). This 
effect corresponds to the highly significant coefficient in row 2 of Table 10. Similarly, raising 
the average house value in a unit’s tract by one standard deviation has little impact on net 
incidence (fifth row), but lowering this average value cuts the net incidence measure by about 34 
percent, from 23.8 percent (row 2) to 15.8 percent (row 6). The effect of altering the share of old 
housing in a unit’s tract is similar, with little impact from an increase (row 7) and a large impact 
of a decrease (row 8). In fact, lowering average value by one standard deviation cuts net 
incidence by about 25 percent (to 17.6). The effects in rows 6 to 8 correspond to the significant 
coefficients in rows 4 and 5 of Table 9. 
 Finally, Table 13 shows that the predicted net incidence of discrimination falls 
dramatically when a unit is in an integrated neighborhood but the advertised unit is not. In fact, 
the result in the last row of this table reveals that the predicted net incidence measure falls to zero 
if the unit is in a suburban integrated tract and the advertised unit is in a white suburban tract.40  
Thus, the significant effect in row 10 of Table 10 is large, indeed. 
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Conclusion 
 
 We find that agents interpret a customer’s initial request as an indication of the 
customer’s preferences. As a result, agents are relatively likely to show the advertised unit and 
relatively unlikely to show units that differ from the advertised unit in terms of asking price, size 
(number of bedrooms), or neighborhood quality (average house value, share of old housing). 
 Our results also indicate that real estate agents practice redlining in the suburbs, defined 
as a low marketing effort in or near integrated neighborhoods. This behavior, which is illegal 
under the Fair Housing Act, arises even for advertised units, that is, even for units that a 
customer explicitly asks to see. This behavior does not take place, however, in central cities. 
 Discrimination could be driven by agent prejudice, white customer prejudice, or 
statistical discrimination. We find no evidence to support the agent-prejudice hypothesis, but our 
tests are not very powerful.  We find some evidence to support the customer-prejudice 
hypothesis. Specifically, larger real estate agencies are less likely to discriminate and 
discrimination is relatively high in integrated neighborhoods where tipping appears to be likely. 
 Our most striking results point to the existence of statistical discrimination. Agents’ 
marketing efforts for blacks, unlike those for whites, do not increase as the asking price of the 
advertised house increases; however, these efforts do increase as the asking price of a house falls 
below the price of the advertised unit. These results indicate that agents believe the probability of 
a successful transaction with a black customer decreases with the asking price, regardless of the 
customer’s initial request. This belief could reflect an agent’s experience with black customers 
but it cannot, of course, reflect the qualification of the black auditors. In any case, acting on this 
belief is a form of statistical discrimination, because it uses a preconceived characteristic of 
blacks on average as a signal about an individual black customer. 
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 In addition, we find less discrimination in suburban integrated areas than in other areas 
and we find that real estate agents make different inferences about the preferences of black and 
white customers who make the same housing request. Discrimination is relatively low for houses 
in neighborhoods with an average house value or a share of old housing below that in the 
advertised unit’s neighborhood, and it is relatively low for houses with visible problems, so long 
as the advertised unit has problems too. These effects are not linked to particular housing traits, 
as such, but instead are linked to differences between a house and the house initially requested. 
Thus, agents typically accept the initial request as an accurate portrayal of a white’s preferences 
but adjust the initial request made by a black to conform with their preconceptions. In the case of 
houses with visible problems, agents refuse to accept the initial request as a sign that whites want 
such a house, but have no trouble making this inference for blacks. These actions are all 
consistent with statistical discrimination.  
 Previous research has not uncovered the prevalence of statistical discrimination largely 
because it could not connect discrimination to customer’s initial requests or to the characteristics 
of individual houses. Our research supports the view that real estate agents’ preconceptions are a 
central cause of housing discrimination and that statistical discrimination is widely practiced in 
housing sales.  Because statistical discrimination is based on anticipated profits, this finding 
indicates that some housing discrimination has economic causes and may prove to be difficult to 
eradicate without active enforcement of fair-housing legislation.41 
 Our findings also raise several issues of more general interest. First, customer requests 
play an important role in many markets, including the labor and mortgage markets, and empirical 
analysis of these markets needs to consider the impact of such requests on estimates of 
discrimination. Because these requests are typically unobservable, accounting for them 
constitutes a major challenge for empirical research, particularly when the requests are 
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influenced by past or expected discriminatory acts. Second, theoretical research on search and 
agency could consider the role of customer requests as signals to agents.42  This type of 
extension might provide new insights into both the incentives for statistical discrimination and 
the long-run impact of such discrimination on markets. 
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Table 1.    Auditor, Agent, and Audit Characteristics 
 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Auditor Characteristics     
Age of auditora 37.337 6.988 24 66 
Audit role = married couplea 0.881 0.323 0 1 
Auditor is femalea 0.605 0.489 0 1 
Audit role = previous ownera 0.493 0.497 0 1 
     
Agent and Agency Characteristics     
Age of agent 42.392 10.795 20 74 
Agent is Black 0.025 0.154 0 1 
Agent is female 0.661 0.473 0 1 
Agent used an MLS 0.516 0.500 0 1 
Advertised unit is not inspected 0.123 0.328 0 1 
Maximum number of people encountered 1.811 1.169 0 8 
Audit teammates see the same agent 0.547 0.546 0 1 
     
Audit Characteristics     
Audit is in July 0.479 0.500 0 1 
Audit is in August 0.055 0.228 0 1 
Audit is in the morning 0.329 0.470 0 1 
Black auditor goes first 0.508 0.500 0 1 
     aAuditor characteristics refer to the black auditor.  White auditor characteristics are the same or similar. 
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Table 2.    Housing Unit Characteristics 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Unit is the advertised unit 0.450 0.498 0 1 
Asking price of unit 137805 82664 11500 520000 
Median housing price in unit’s neighborhood 158735 116308 22100 500001 
Number of bedrooms in the unit 2.815 0.982 0 9 
Unit is a condominium 0.263 0.440 0 1 
Unit is newly constructed 0.092 0.289 0 1 
Unit has visible problemsa 0.190 0.399 0 1 
Advertised unit is in the central city 0.449 0.495 0 1 
Distance to integrated tract 2.953 2.916 0.118 21.649 
Distance to agent’s office 4.073 4.412 0 37.434 
Distance to advertised unit 1.515 3.365 0 35.900 
Share of housing built before 1940 0.449 0.495 0 1 
Unit’s neighborhood > 15 percent black 0.178 0.383 0 1 
     aVisible problems include peeling paint (interior or exterior), broken windows, and debris in the yard. 
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Table 4.    Variables and General Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis For: 
Variable Type Variable Interaction with Race 
Characteristics of the unit being shown (the unit that 
defines an observation 
 
Marketing depends on 
characteristics of the unit 
Discrimination depends on 
characteristics of the unit 
Characteristics of the advertised unit (the unit that is 
the entry for an audit) 
 
Marketing depends on 
initial request 
Discrimination depends on 
initial request 
Characteristics of the unit being shown when it is the 
advertised unit 
(which equal 0 for non-advertised units) 
 
Marketing is different for 
advertised unit 
Discrimination is different 
for advertised unit 
Variables to describe the match between the unit being 
shown and the advertised unit (which are interactions) 
 
Marketing depends on 
match with initial request 
Discrimination depends on 
match with initial request 
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Table 3.    Examples for an Audit with Three Units 
 
 
Value for 
Unit 1 
Value for 
Unit 2 
Value for 
Unit 3 
Example 1:  Discrete Variablea 
Characteristics of the unit being shown 
(the unit that defines an observation) 
 
1 1 0 
Characteristics of the advertised unit (the unit that is the 
entry for an audit; does not vary within an audit) 
 
1 1 1 
Characteristics of the unit being shown when it is the 
advertised unit (which equal 0 for non-advertised units) 
 
1 0 0 
The Match between the unit being shown and the advertised 
unit (an interaction) 
1 1 0 
    
Example 2:  Continuous Variableb 
Characteristic of the advertised unit (the unit that is the entry 
for an audit; does not vary within an audit) 
 
135 135 135 
Characteristic of the unit being shown when it is the 
advertised unit (which equals zero for non-advertised units) 
 
135 0 0 
Difference between the unit being shown and the advertised 
unit when this difference is positive (an interaction) 
 
0 0 10 
Absolute value of the difference between the unit being 
shown and the advertised unit when this difference is 
negative (an interaction) 
 
0 15 0 
     aBased on the variable INTEG = 1 if unit is in an integrated area.  Unit 1:  The advertised unit, in an 
integrated area; Unit 2:  Not the advertised unit, also in an integrated area; Unit 3:  Not the advertised unit, 
NOT in integrated area.   
     bBased on variable ASKPRICE = Asking Price of Unit ($1,000).  Unit 1:  The advertised unit, 
ASKPRICE = 135; Unit 2:  Not the advertised unit, ASKPRICE = 120; Unit 3:  Not the advertised unit, 
ASKPRICE = 145. 
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Table 5.    Adverse Treatment by Unit Characteristics 
 
 
Sample 
Size 
Equal 
Treatment 
White 
Favored 
Black 
Favored 
Net 
Incidence 
A.  Entire Sample      
Entire sample 2,465 0.304 0.411 0.285 0.126 
      
B.  Whether Unit is 
Advertised Unit 
    
Not advertised unit 1,357 0.091 0.544 0.365 0.179 
Advertised unit 1,108 0.564 0.248 0.188 0.060 
      
C.  Asking Price of Unit Compared to 
Metropolitan Average 
   
Lower asking price 1,332 0.302 0.411 0.287 0.124 
Higher asking price 1,133 0.307 0.410 0.283 0.127 
      
D.  Whether Unit is a 
Condominium 
    
Not a condominium 1,818 0.334 0.401 0.265 0.136 
Condominium 647 0.219 0.439 0.342 0.097 
      
E.  Number of Bedrooms in 
Unit 
    
Fewer than three 779 0.268 0.429 0.303 0.126 
Three 1,145 0.331 0.397 0.272 0.125 
More than three 541 0.299 0.414 0.287 0.127 
      
F.  Whether the Unit is Newly 
Constructed 
    
Previously owned 2,239 0.321 0.406 0.273 0.133 
Newly constructed 226 0.137 0.456 0.407 0.049 
      
G.  Whether Unit has Visible 
Problems 
    
No problems 1,975 0.273 0.430 0.297 0.133 
Problems 490 0.430 0.333 0.237 0.096 
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Table 6.    Adverse Treatment by Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
 
Sample 
Size 
Equal 
Treatment 
White 
Favored 
Black 
Favored 
Net 
Incidence 
A.  Average Value in Neighborhood Compared 
to MSA Aveage 
  
Lower average value 1,458 0.299 0.407 0.284 0.113 
Higher average value 1,007 0.311 0.416 0.273 0.143 
     
B.  Racial Composition of 
Neighborhood 
    
< 5 percent Black 2,025 0.314 0.405 0.281 0.124 
> 15 percent Black 440 0.259 0.436 0.305 0.131 
      
C.  Central City Location     
In central city 1,098 0.326 0.403 0.271 0.131 
In suburbs 1,345 0.283 0.419 0.298 0.120 
      
D. Distance to Integrated Area    
High distance 868 0.323 0.386 0.291 0.094 
Low distance 1,597 0.294 0.425 0.282 0.143 
      
E.  Distance to Agent’s Office    
High distance 819 0.315 0.381 0.304 0.077 
Low distance 1,646 0.298 0.426 0.276 0.150 
      
F.  Share of Old 
Housing 
     
High share 767 0.321 0.419 0.261 0.158 
Low share 1,698 0.296 0.408 0.296 0.111 
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Table 7.    Adverse Treatment Based on Characteristics of 
Unit Compared to Advertised Unit 
 
 
Sample 
Size 
Equal 
Treatment 
White 
Favored 
Black 
Favored 
Net 
Incidence 
A.  Asking Price of Unit Compared to 
Advertised Unit 
   
Unit’s price lower 399 0.095 0.499 0.406 0.093 
Similar price 1,560 0.324 0.343 0.233 0.110 
Unit’s price higher 506 0.099 0.551 0.350 0.201 
      
B.  Average Value in Unit’s Neighborhood 
Compared to Advertised Unit 
  
Unit’s value lower 313 0.073 0.492 0.435 0.057 
Similar value 1,502 0.347 0.326 0.227 0.099 
Unit’s value higher 650 0.084 0.568 0.348 0.220 
      
C.  Number of Bedrooms in Unit 
Compared to Advertised Unit 
   
Unit has fewer 216 0.102 0.532 0.366 0.167 
Unit has same 1,945 0.357 0.387 0.256 0.131 
Unit has more 304 0.109 0.477 0.414 0.063 
      
D.  Whether the Unit or Advertised Unit 
is Newly Constructed 
   
Both previously owned 2,126 0.332 0.399 0.269 0.130 
Unit new 70 0.029 0.543 0.429 0.114 
Unit previously owned 113 0.097 0.549 0.354 0.195 
Both new 156 0.186 0.417 0.397 0.020 
      
E.  Whether Unit or Advertised has 
Visible Problems 
   
Neither with problems 1,839 0.286 0.420 0.294 0.126 
Unit with problems 240 0.179 0.496 0.325 0.171 
Unit without problems 136 0.088 0.574 0.338 0.236 
Both with problems 250 0.696 0.176 0.152 0.024 
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Table 8.    Coefficient Estimates for Auditor, Agent, 
and Audit Characteristics 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Coefficient for 
Interaction with Race 
Auditor Characteristics   
Age of the auditor -1.1627 
(-1.314) 
 
0.2887 
(0.325) 
Audit role = married couple -0.1053 
(-0.289) 
 
0.4966* 
(2.445) 
Auditor is female 0.2783 
(1.187) 
 
1.2789 
(1.004) 
Audit role = previous owner -0.0305 
(-0.145) 
 
0.0058 
(0.039) 
   
Agent and Agency 
Characteristics 
  
Age of agent 0.1679 
(0.267) 
 
0.2127 
(0.344) 
Agent is black 0.0500 
(0.129) 
 
0.0638 
(0.171) 
Agent is female 0.0639 
(0.467) 
0.0958 
(0.711) 
 
Agent used an MLS -0.0207 
(-0.084) 
0.0606 
(0.440) 
 
Advertised unit not inspected -1.2258 
(-1.692) 
 
0.3329 
(1.108) 
Maximum number of people 
encountered 
-0.0927 
(-0.879) 
 
1.2453* 
(2.398) 
Audit teammates see the same agent 1.1425* 
(4.826) 
 
0.0006 
(0.005) 
   
Audit Characteristics   
Audit is in July -1.0230 
(-0.001) 
 
-0.0240 
(-0.000) 
Audit is in August -0.7694 
(-1.416) 
 
-0.1141 
(-0.400) 
Audit is in the morning 0.0726 
(0.615) 
0.0229 
(0.144) 
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Black auditor goes first 0.1540 
(0.735) 
-0.1799 
(-0.446) 
Note:  t-statistics are in parentheses.  An * indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
(two-tailed test).  Estimated with a multinomial logit model.  Results for site dummies are 
not reported. 
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Table 9.    Coefficient Estimates for Unit Characteristicsa 
 
Unit Attribute*Adv. 
Unit Attribute 
Row/Variable Name 
Unit 
Attribute 
Advertised Unit 
Attribute One Two 
Advertised 
Unit*Unit 
Attribute 
1. Advertised Unit 3.7605* 
(2.957) 
 
    
2. Asking Priceb  7.3351* 
(2.072) 
 
-0.3465 
(-0.426) 
0.3374 
(0.394) 
-6.5129 
(-1.858) 
3. Number of Bedroomsb  -2.6366 
(-1.001) 
 
-1.3542* 
(-3.279) 
-1.4165* 
(-2.641) 
0.1415 
(0.045) 
4. Tract Average Valueb  -0.0004 
(-0.002) 
 
-1.3376 
(-1.831) 
0.1517 
(0.409) 
0.0051 
(0.017) 
5. Tract Share of Old Housing  -0.0750 
(-0.001) 
-8.3666* 
(-2.511) 
-1.3740* 
(-3.097) 
 
-0.8549* 
(-2.017) 
6. Condominium -0.4695 
(-0.784) 
-1.0425 
(-1.274) 
 
0.7204 
(0.794) 
 -1.2580 
(-1.940) 
7. New Construction -2.0580* 
(-2.193) 
 
-0.3816 
(-0.696) 
2.0752 
(1.701) 
 -1.7205* 
(-2.292) 
8. Problems with Unit 0.4265 
(1.125) 
 
0.5113 
(0.970) 
0.2302 
(0.332) 
 0.8852 
(1.488) 
9. Unit in Central City 0.8211 
(1.430) 
0.3086 
(0.399) 
 
-2.4428* 
(-2.591) 
 1.0511* 
(2.006) 
10. Tract Integrated -2.5751* 
(-3.009) 
 
-1.3209 
(-1.573) 
2.4275* 
(2.139) 
 0.5525 
(-0.650) 
11. Distance to Integrated Tract -0.0565 
(-0.663) 
 
-0.1461 
(-1.251) 
0.0057 
(0.496) 
 0.1944* 
(2.332) 
12. Distance to Agent’s Office 0.0060 
(0.0098) 
 
-0.0791 
(-0.380) 
-0.0003 
(-0.110) 
 0.0409 
(0.622) 
13. Distance from Unit to Advertised 
Unit 
-0.0083 
(-0.133) 
 
    
14.  Tract Integrated x Unit in 
Central City 
1.8306* 
(2.018) 
 
   -1.2944 
(-1.164) 
     aAbsolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  The symbol * represents significance at the 5 percent level or 
higher (two-tailed test).  Estimated with a multinomial logit model. 
     bThis variable is continuous.  The unit attribute does not enter the specification directly.  Rather, two variables 
are included:  (1) the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is positive, and (2) 
the absolute value of the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is negative.  Their 
estimated coefficients are listed in columns labeled one and two, respectively. 
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Table 10.    Coefficient Estimates for Unit Characteristics Interacted with Racea 
 
Unit Attribute*Adv. 
Unit Attribute 
Row/Variable Name 
Unit 
Attribute 
Advertised Unit 
Attribute One Two 
Advertised 
Unit*Unit 
Attribute 
1. Advertised Unit 0.3566 
(0.480) 
 
    
2. Asking Priceb  -5.1591* 
(-3.069) 
 
0.1865 
(0.702) 
1.0630* 
(7.440) 
3.7200 
(1.921) 
3. Number of Bedroomsb  1.1264 
(0.938) 
 
0.2332 
(1.618) 
-0.1211 
(-0.592) 
-1.2796 
(-0.684) 
4. Tract Average Valueb  0.1515 
(1.437) 
 
-0.1065 
(-0.657) 
0.4550* 
(2.091) 
0.0090 
(0.061) 
5. Tract Share of Old Housing  -0.0423 
(-0.000) 
 
0.9461 
(1.102) 
2.4158* 
(2.185) 
0.1120 
(-0.457) 
6. Condominium 0.3148 
(-1.031) 
 
0.6974 
(1.443) 
-0.5770 
(-1.064) 
 -0.6380 
(-1.679) 
7. New Construction 0.2739 
(0.934) 
-0.2160 
(-0.858) 
0.2986 
(0.638) 
 
 0.0439 
(0.106) 
8. Problems with Unit -0.0974 
(-0.485) 
 
-0.0956 
(-0.406) 
0.9848* 
(2.675) 
 -0.8127* 
(-2.206) 
9. Unit in Central City -0.0009 
(-0.003) 
 
-0.0276 
(-0.072) 
0.4342 
(0.954) 
 -0.1694 
(-0.541) 
10. Tract Integrated 0.5957* 
(2.085) 
0.1136 
(0.387) 
 
-0.4332 
(-1.032) 
 -0.0953 
(-0.204) 
11. Distance to Integrated Tract 0.0546 
(1.441) 
 
0.0769 
(1.586) 
-0.0053 
(-1.011) 
 -0.0286 
(-0.522) 
12. Distance to Agent’s Office 0.0440 
(1.699) 
 
0.0110 
(0.439) 
-0.0006 
(-0.377) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.016) 
13. Distance from Unit to Advertised 
Unit 
-0.0330 
(-1.352) 
 
    
14. Tract Integrated x Unit in 
Central City 
-0.9263* 
(-2.532) 
   0.9138 
(1.506) 
     aAbsolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  The symbol * represents significance at the 5 percent level or 
higher (two-tailed test).  Estimated with a multinomial logit model. 
     bThis variable is continuous.  The unit attribute does not enter the specification directly.  Rather, two variables 
are included:  (1) the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is positive, and (2) 
the absolute value of the difference between unit and advertised unit attribute when the difference is negative.  Their 
estimated coefficients are listed in columns labeled one and two, respectively. 
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Table 11.    Agent Marketing Behavior by Unit Location, 
Advertised Unitsa 
 
Unit in Central City Unit in Integrated 
Neighborhood Yes No 
Yes -0.642 
(-1.199) 
[124] 
-0.916* 
(-1.648) 
[73] 
 
No -0.262 
(-0.471) 
[412] 
 
0.000 
(n.a.) 
[455] 
     aEach cell contains three entries.  The first number is the 
coefficient estimate, the number in parentheses is the t-statistic, and 
the number of observations is in brackets.  An asterisk indicates 
significance at the 10 percent level or higher (two-tailed test).   
Based on the multinomial logit results in Table 9 
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Table 12.    Agent Marketing Behavior by Unit Location, 
Non-advertised Unitsa 
 
Unit in Central City 
Yes No 
Unit in Integrated 
Neighborhood 
Advertised 
Unit in 
Central City 
Advertised 
Unit in 
Suburbs 
Advertised 
Unit in 
Central City 
Advertised 
Unit in 
Suburbs 
Yes     
Advertised unit in 
integrated neighborhood 
-0.951 
(-1.199) 
[62] 
 
1.118 
(1.347) 
[2] 
-1.160 
(-1.073) 
[2] 
-1.469* 
(-1.998) 
[54] 
Advertised unit in white 
neighborhood 
-2.058* 
(-2.432) 
[21] 
 
0.077 
(0.090) 
[25] 
-2.266 
(-1.934) 
[2] 
-2.575* 
(-3.009) 
[55] 
     
No     
Advertised unit in 
integrated neighborhood 
-2.634* 
(-2.751) 
[29] 
 
-0.500 
(-0.490) 
[0] 
-1.012 
(-0.896) 
[4] 
-1.321 
(-1.573) 
[32] 
Advertised unit in white 
neighborhood 
-1.313* 
(-2.826) 
[282] 
 
0.821 
(1.430) 
[126] 
0.309 
(0.399) 
[9] 
0.000 
(n.a.) 
[607] 
     aEach cell contains three entries.  The first number is the coefficient estimate, the number in 
parentheses is the t-statistic, and the number of observations is in brackets.  An asterisk indicates 
significance at the 5 percent level or higher (two-tailed test).   Based on the multinomial logit 
results in Table 9. 
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Table 13.    Predicted Treatment for Non-Advertised Units 
Under Various Circumstances 
(share of cases) 
 
 
Equal 
Treatment 
White 
Favored 
Black 
Favored 
Net 
Incidence 
Baseline Predictions     
Sample of Non-Advertised Units 0.091 0.544 0.365 0.179 
For Mean “Matching” Non-Advertised Unita 0.222 0.508 0.270 0.238 
     
Predictions with One Variable Changed     
Higher Asking Price than Advertised Unitb 0.217 0.506 0.278 0.228 
Lower Asking Price than Advertised Unitb 0.243 0.465 0.292 0.173 
     
Higher Mean Value than Advertised Unit’s Tractb 0.150 0.560 0.289 0.271 
Lower Mean Value than Advertised Unit’s Tractb 0.247 0.456 0.298 0.158 
     
More Old Housing than Advertised Unit’s Tractb 0.142 0.539 0.319 0.220 
Less Old Housing than Advertised Unit’s Tractb 0.144 0.531 0.355 0.176 
     
Unit in Integrated Suburban Tractc 0.040 0.478 0.482 -0.004 
Unit in White Central City Tractc 0.337 0.437 0.226 0.211 
Unit in Integrated Central City Tractc 0.082 0.460 0.458 0.003 
     aPredicted treatment for a non-advertised unit that has the average characteristics of the sample of 
advertised units and that is associated with an advertised unit with those same characteristics.  Two 
characteristics, namely whether unit is in central city or in an integrated tract, are set at their modes, not at their 
means.  The modal category is a white, suburban tract. 
     bPredicted treatment based on the case in row 2 with only one change, namely an increase or decrease of 
one standard deviation in the identified characteristic. 
     cPredicted treatment for a non-advertised unit in the type of tract indicated, assuming that the advertised unit 
is still in a white, suburban tract, as in row 2. 
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 Endnotes 
 
 
1. To keep the exposition concise, this paper refers to non-Hispanic whites as whites and 
treats “race” as a socially defined category. See Yinger (1995). 
 
2. This shift also has two other advantages not connected to requests. First, it eliminates an 
endogeneity problem that arises because a real estate agents decisions simultaneously 
determine the number of houses shown to a customer (an dependent variable in the 
traditional approach) and the characteristics of those houses (explanatory variables). In 
our approach, an agents decision to show a house obviously cannot affect that houses 
characteristics. Second it expands the sample size from the number of audits to the 
number of houses shown to either auditor. 
 
3. The HDS data are used by Page (1995); Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger (1999); Ondrich, 
Stricker, and Yinger (1998, 1999); Turner and Michelsons (1992); and Yinger (1995). 
 
4. Some address information is missing, especially unit numbers for condominiums, which 
made up 16 percent of the housing units in the sample. As a result, we developed 
procedures to rule out the possibility that teammates saw the same unit when teammates 
saw units that had the same, incomplete, address information but differed in some 
observable characteristic, such as number of rooms or location in the building.  
 
5. In a few cases, particularly with condominiums, there is more than one advertised unit, in 
which case these characteristics refer to the average unit in this set. 
6. The Fair Housing Act says, for example, that it is illegal to “to induce or attempt to 
induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or 
prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”  
7. For a given audit, we know that the unit about which the auditors inquire was advertised 
and listed by the visited agent, but we do not know whether other units that arise during 
the audit were advertised nor do we know whether these units were listed by another 
agent and accessed through a MLS.  However, we do not that these other units might not 
have been advertised and might be listed by another agent. 
 
8. An agents potential customers might also care about the sex of an unmarried black 
neighbor, but this possibility is not relevant here because virtually all of the auditors in 
these audits were assigned the role of a married person. 
 
9. This hypothesis, like the previous one, can be traced to Becker (1971) who showed that 
an employer might discriminate against black applicants to keep down the wage demands 
of prejudiced white employees. 
 
10. A finding that larger agencies are less likely to discriminate is also consistent with the 
hypothesis that these firms devote more resources to fair-housing education, either 
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because of economies of scale in such training or because their visibility makes them 
more likely targets of discrimination suits. 
 
11. For example, agents may believe that black singles are particularly unlikely to complete a 
transaction, wither because of assumed financial limitations or anticipated discrimination 
in mortgage lending.  This is an example of statistical discrimination, which is discussed 
below.  
 
12. See Yinger (1998) for more on the equivalence of the perceived preference hypothesis 
and statistical discrimination.  One test for statistical discrimination in the marketing of 
housing can be found in Yinger (1995), who presents evidence to support the view that 
landlords are reluctant to rent to single black women because of the stereotype that these 
women are often on welfare. 
  
13. A key issue in the labor literature on statistical discrimination is that the quality of the 
observable information may differ across groups. See Phelps (1972) and Cain (1986). In 
a housing audit, the quality of the information about a customer’s purchasing power, 
which is analogous to productivity, is identical across audit teammates so this issue does 
not arise. 
 
14. The theory of statistical discrimination predicts that preconceptions not connected to 
profits will be driven out by competition, at least in the long run, but we have no way to 
test for a link to profitability.  Also, this behavior is not statistical discrimination if the 
agent acts on the basis of preconceptions that he does not connect to profits.  Real estate 
agents, like other people, are certainly not immune to race-based preconceptions that 
have nothing to do with profits, but there is no reason to think that these preconceptions 
are related to particular housing characteristics.  As we will see, the link to particular 
housing characteristics gives power to these tests for statistical discrimination.   
15. The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any 
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 
16. Phelps (1972) makes it clear that statistical discrimination cannot arise unless the cost of 
gaining the necessary information is “excessive.”  In an audit, a housing agent could 
obtain the information he needs about a customer’s purchasing power simply by asking, 
but apparently, inquiries of this type are not usually made. Moreover, they are more 
likely to be made for blacks than for whites. In HDS, for example, agents didn’t even ask 
about a customer’s income in over half the audits and the probability that they made this 
inquiry was 8 percentage points higher for blacks than for whites (Yinger 1995, 
Table 3.3). 
  
17. For reviews of the evidence on discrimination in mortgage lending, see Goering and 
Wienk (1996), Ladd (1998), and Ross and Yinger (forthcoming). 
 
18. Using audit data for Detroit, Roychoudhury and Goodman (1992) find some evidence to 
support this prediction, which is often associated with the perceived preference 
hypothesis. 
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19. We attempted to determine which of these two possibilities was at work using 1990 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data, which indicates applications and loan denials by 
location by race. We could not find any HMDA variables with any explanatory power in 
our regressions. See also Ondrich et al. (2001). This could indicate that real estate agents’ 
beliefs do not reflect actual experience with lenders or it could indicate that the HMDA 
data are not up to the task. For more on these data, see Goering and Wienk (1996).  Note 
also that there is a third possible source of these agent preferences, namely, that agents 
believe that white sellers of more expensive homes tend not to be willing to sell to blacks 
(even without contact between the agent and the seller, as is typical in a MLS 
transaction). This seems unlikely, however, because prejudice tends to decline with 
income and neighborhoods with expensive houses are not usually threatened with tipping. 
  
20. This belief might be based on experience.  Munnell et al. (1996) find, for example, that, 
on average, black mortgage applicants have higher loan-to-value and debt-to-income 
ratios than do whites.  
 
21  We observe the outcome for the advertised unit even if it is withheld from both auditors. 
In this case, however, many of the unit characteristics relevant to the analysis are missing 
from the data. Thus, we exclude from our sample the few advertised units withheld from 
both auditors. 
 
22  We ran a model without controls for omitted variables and obtained substantially 
different results for several coefficients. The complete results, i.e., without audit random 
effects, are available upon request. 
 
23. HDS sent the same audit-teammate pairs to conduct several audits each. This makes it 
possible to construct models in which andW Bθ θ  are each the sum of an audit-specific 
effect and a pair-specific effect. We estimated two such models and found the 
improvement of fit measured by Akaike’s Information Criterion (see Akaike 1973) to be 
small enough to reject the incorporation of the additional pair-specific effect. See also 
Ondrich, et al. (2001). 
  
24. Because andW BZ Z  contain unit-specific information, their values can change across 
observed units within an audit. Let j index an observed unit within an audit. Then 
conditional on the WjZ ’s and the BjZ ’s and all sample jS ’s being one, the joint likelihood 
contribution of all J observed units within an audit is given by 
 
 ( ) ( )
11
( , ) , 1, , , , , ,
J K
W Wj B Bj j Wj Bj Wk Bk W Wk B Bk
jk
L P Y Y Y Y S Z Z P
==
 β δ = = = = θ θ θ = θ θ = θ  ∑∏  
 
where ( , )Wj BjY Y  is the observed outcome for unit j and K is the number of points of 
increase. The likelihood function to be maximized is the product of joint likelihood 
contributions across audits in the sample. To specify K, we follow Trussell-Richards 
(1985) by starting with a single point of increase and successively adding a new point 
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until likelihood improvement stops. We stopped at k=3. Estimates for 
{ }( , ), 1,...,Wk Bk k Kθ θ =  and 1 1,..., kp p −  are available from the authors upon request, 
where ip  is the probability associated with Wiθ  and Biθ  in the mixing distribution. Note 
that Kp  does not provide independent information because the sum of the probabilities is 
one. 
  
25. Neighborhood characteristics in the HDS reports and in subsequent research using the 
HDS data (see note 3) are based on a private firm’s estimates of demographics in each 
census tract in 1988. 
  
26. For a discussion of net incidence and other measures of discrimination, see Fix, Galster, 
and Stuyk (1993), Yinger (1995), and especially, Ondrich, et al. (1999). 
  
27. Agents are also less likely to show units in neighborhoods that have a higher average 
value than the advertised unit’s neighborhood (row 4, third column), but this result is 
only significant at the 10 percent level. 
  
28. We find no evidence of redlining against neighborhoods with low house values (Table 9, 
row 4).  Because there is some evidence of redlining against low-income neighborhoods 
by lenders (Ross and Tootell, forthcoming)and because house value is highly correlated 
with income, our negative finding hints that redlining by real estate brokers is not driven 
by their expectation of redlining by lenders. 
 
29. Although we control for several neighborhood characteristics other than integration, the 
results discussed in this paragraph could be subject to omitted variable bias because of 
neighborhood characteristics we do not observe. 
 
30. Consider, for example, an advertised unit in an integrated neighborhood in the central 
city. For this type of unit, all the variables in rows 9, 10, and 14 in Table 9 are switched 
“on,” so the net effect (relative to an advertised unit in a white, suburban neighborhood) 
involves the sum of all ten coefficients in these three rows. If we had presented odds 
ratios instead of the log odds ratio, we would, of course, have to multiply coefficients to 
obtain the net effects.  The sample size information in Tables 10 and 11 indicate that our 
results are based on 73 advertised units and 113 other units in suburban, integrated 
neighborhoods. 
  
31. The frequencies also are consistent with the presence of inferred preferences, as agents 
who advertise in white areas tend not to show units in integrated areas (see the low 
frequencies in the second row) and agents who advertise in integrated areas tend not to 
show units in white areas (see the low frequencies in the third row). However, these 
frequencies might also indicate that real estate agents tend to specialize in either white or 
integrated areas.  
 
32. Implicit across-cell restrictions in the functional form in Table 10 yield an estimate for 
the third row of the second column of Table 12 even with no observations in that cell. 
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The coefficients in several other cells with only two observations also are identified 
primarily based on across-cell restrictions. 
  
33. Agents who advertise a unit in the suburbs rarely show units in the central city (see the 
low frequencies in the second column) and agents who advertise in the central city rarely 
show units in the suburbs (see the low frequencies in the third column). These counts 
may indicate that agents choose not to show units conflicting with a customer’s inferred 
preferences even if those units are available, or they may indicate that agents with central 
city listings have access to different information sources about available housing than do 
agents with suburban listings. 
  
34.  Another result in Table 10 that supports the white-customer-prejudice hypothesis is only 
significant at the 10 percent level. To be specific, the farther a unit from the agent’s 
office, the more likely the agent will show it to blacks (row 12, first column), presumably 
because selling units far from the agent’s office to blacks is unlikely to have 
repercussions for the agent’s reputation with his established white customers. Ondrich et 
al. (2001) find that this result is highly significant in some metropolitan areas. 
 
35. This result does not appear to hold for the advertised unit (row 14, fifth column). This 
difference for the advertised unit, which is not quite significant at the 10 percent level, 
might be another sign of inferred preferences at work or it might indicate that agents only 
advertise in integrated, central city neighborhoods when they are not worried about 
tipping. 
    
36. The coefficient for the asking price of the advertised unit itself (row 2, fifth column, 
significant at the 10 percent level) indicates that this effect is smaller for the advertised 
unit, but still exists.  As in other cases, this result suggests that inferred preferences offset 
statistical discrimination to some degree. 
 
37 . See Ondrich et al. (2001) for a more detailed discussion of redlining and steering. 
Steering is also discussed at length by Galster (1990b) and Turner and Mickelsons 
(1992).   
 
38. The white-customer-prejudice hypothesis suggests that agents might steer blacks toward 
less established neighborhoods.  This hypothesis can be tested with variables of the first 
form in Table 2.  These variables are not significant in Table 10, unlike those associated 
with statistical discrimination (which have the fourth form in Table 2). 
 
39. In row 8, the coefficients in both the third and fifth columns are highly significant. Since 
both of these coefficients apply to the advertised unit and the one in the third column is 
larger in absolute value, they imply that advertised units with problems are also more 
likely to be shown to blacks than to whites, although this effect is small. 
  
40. Discrimination declines relative to the baseline when the unit is in an integrated tract in 
the central city because the coefficient in row 10 of Table 10 is more than offset by the 
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significant coefficient in the last row of Table 10. However, this combined effect is not 
statistically significant (t = 0.851). 
 
41. The cost of this discrimination is difficult to estimate.  For one attempt, see Yinger 
(1997).  
 
42. Yavas (1995) surveys the theoretical literature on real estate agency. This literature 
focuses on a search process with buyer and seller uncertainty but has not yet considered 
the signals sent by a buyer to the real estate agent. Courant (1978) and Yinger (1997) 
examine the impact of discrimination on a home buyer’s search problem. 
 
